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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of unemployment on migration. In a theoretical model, we show
that unemployment, per se, does not a¤ect migration. Rather, migration only occurs when unemploy-
ment shocks force residents to update their expectations of the areas unemployment rate. Once these
expectations change, migration reallocates labor to bring the economy back to equilibrium. To test
this theory, we devise an empirical strategy using state level data in the U.S. from 2000 to 2010, we
nd strong empirical evidence that unemployment shocks outside of expectations have a far greater
impact on migration than unemployment shocks that are within expectations.
JEL Codes: R23, J61, D8
Keywords: Migration, Unemployment, Expectations
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1 Introduction
Labor market theory has long posited that economic factors induce migration across regions; see Lowry
(1966) for an early exposition and Wozniak (2010) and Saks and Wozniak (2011) for an updated treatment.
This migration helps reallocate resources to those regions where it is most valued and away from regions
where it is least valued. One such factor considered to be an important driver of migration is unemploy-
ment: people, the theory holds, should immigrate to regions with low unemployment and emigrate from
regions with high unemployment.
This prediction has been tested numerous times in the empirical literature. One common approach
is to regress net migration on a regions unemployment rate and other covariates, using either state- or
MSA-level data. For all its intuitive appeal, this prediction has not found consistent support in the data.
As Greenwood (1975, 1997) notes, the coe¢ cient on unemployment often has an unexpected sign or is not
statistically signicant.
There have been many suggestions why the empirical results do not conrm the theoretical intuition.
One possible explanation is that, by using aggregate data, the studies were unable to capture the personal
characteristics of interest; see, for example, Navratil and Doyle (1977). Another explanation is that
simple panel regressions fail to capture the plethora of options available to a potential migrant, including
the possible option of not migrating. This insight inspired a number of studies that employ a conditional
logit model, such as Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001) and Wozniak (2010).
In this paper, we present an alternative explanation. It is our contention that these unintuitive
results stem from model misspecication. Specically, we show that migration does not respond to the
observed level of unemployment, per se, but rather people migrate due to changes in their expectations
of unemployment across regions. The previous literature, in failing to account for these expectations,
e¤ectively averaged the e¤ect of unemployment observations that did and did not change expectations.
To formalize this insight, we develop a parsimonious theoretical model of migration. This model
assumes that a nation is composed of two regions, each of which is subject to an unemployment shock.
The unemployment shock represents the probability that a resident in that region is unemployed. If the
resident is unemployed, then she earns nothing; if she works, the resident earns her marginal product
of labor. The residents of the nation are endowed with initial probability models that they believe
characterize the regionsshock processes. In this environment, an equilibrium is dened as the distribution
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of population across regions such that no resident wants to migrate. This condition implies that the
expected wages in the two regions must be equal to each other. As we will show, the initial population
distribution depends on the residents expectations of one regions unemployment rate relative to the
other.
Given the initial equilibrium, we then consider two alternative scenarios. In the rst scenario, we
assume that each region is hit by an unemployment shock that falls within the residentsexpectations.
As we show, this event has no e¤ect on migration because the residents expectations do not change.
In the second scenario, one region is hit with a level of unemployment that is outside of the residents
expectations. As this state of the world was not believed possible, the residents are forced to update their
expectations about the shock process. This change in expectations then induces residents to migrate until
the expected wages are once again equalized.
Using this theoretical model, we derive three testable predictions. First, the level of unemployment only
a¤ects migration if it alters expectations. If, instead, a shock occurs that does not change expectations,
then migration should not occur. It is for this reason, we contend, that the previous literature, which
typically ignores expectations, did not nd a consistent impact of unemployment on migration. Second,
if the shock improves (worsens) the residentsexpectations about region is unemployment shock, then
residents immigrate into (emigrate from) region i. Third, unemployment shocks that cause greater changes
in expectations lead to larger migration responses than shocks that cause smaller changes in expectations.
In our empirical section, we test these three predictions on U.S. state-level data from 2000 to 2010. To
do this, we must di¤erentiate between shocks that are within peoples expectations and shocks that are
outside. As these data are not readily available, we have created a simple empirical test that attempts to
distinguish between these two types of observations. An unemployment shock is dened as within expec-
tations if it is su¢ ciently close to past observations, where "close" is measured by k standard deviations
from the mean of the past data. An unemployment shock is dened as outside expectations if it falls
outside of that range. If k is large enough, then the shock can plausibly be considered unexpected, as
that unemployment rate is far away from what has been observed historically.1
Given these denitions, we nd strong evidence that unemployment observations outside of expecta-
tions have a much larger impact on migration than shocks within expectations. Further, we show that
unemployment rates that are above expectations induce out-migration, while unemployment rates that are
below expectations induce in-migration, just as the theory predicts. These results are robust to a number
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of alternative specications. Our ndings also suggest that unemployment shocks that are further away
from peoples expectations cause a greater impact on migration than shocks that are closer to (but still
outside of) peoples expectations. Finally, we nd no evidence that a correlation between our expectations
variable and large unemployment changes is creating a spurious result.
2 Theoretical model
A nation is divided into two regions, labeled region A and region B. The nation is populated by a
continuum of identical residents. For simplicity, let the size of the continuum of residents be equal to
unity. Call Ri the number of residents living in region i 2 fA;Bg, so that
RA +RB = 1 (1)
These residents are perfectly mobile across region, and migration is costless. This latter assumption could
be relaxed by assuming that migrants have to pay a xed cost to move, but as this would not change our
results, we do not add in this complexity.
Each region is subject to an exogenous unemployment shock, the only source of randomness in the
model. This shock represents the probability that a resident living in region i is unemployed.2 If a
resident is unemployed, she earns nothing. This assumption is without loss of generality, as long as the
amount an unemployed person earns is su¢ ciently small. If a resident is employed, she supplies labor
inelastically and is paid a wage equal to her marginal product of labor. All employment contracts are
assumed to be one period contracts. The production function in region i is
Y i =
 
a  bLiLi
where a and b are constants and Li is the number of workers employed in region i.
The nations residents are endowed with initial probability models that they believe characterize the
regionsunemployment shock processes. The initial probability model for region i, labeled i, is assumed
to have two key characteristics. First, the distribution governing each regions unemployment shock is
identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.).3 Second, the probability model puts positive weight
only on a nite number of unemployment values. Let ni represent the number of possible states of the
world that the residents believe are possible in region i.
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The decision problem of each resident is to maximize her expected wage by deciding in which region
to live. The expected wage of a resident in region i is
E

wi

=
niX
s=1
is

uis (0) +
 
1  uis
  
a  2bLis

= a
 
1  E ui  2bE  1  uiLi
where uis is region is unemployment rate if state s occurs. The residents will continue to migrate until
both regionsexpected wages are equal. When this condition is satised, no resident has the incentive
to migrate. We dene an equilibrium to be the distribution of residents across regions,

RA; RB
	
; such
that
E

wA

= E

wB

(2)
. To nd the initial population distribution across regions, combine (2) with (1) and the restriction that,
in any unemployment state s, Lis =
 
1  uis

Ri. Doing this, the initial population distribution for region
i is
Ri =
a
 
E

uj
  E ui+ 2bE h 1  uj2i
2bE
h
(1  ui)2
i
+ 2bE
h
(1  uj)2
i
where j 6= i. Notice that the initial population in region i depends on the residentsexpectations of each
regions unemployment rate.
Given this initial equilibrium, we can now characterize the determinants of net migration, where net
migration is dened as the percentage change in a regions population. To do so, we consider two
alternative scenarios. In the rst scenario, each region is hit by a shock that lies within the residents
expectations. In the second, one region is hit by a shock that is outside of the residentsexpectations.
For each scenario, we will calculate how migration responds to the observed level of unemployment.
Scenario 1:
Assume that both regions are hit by an unemployment shock that is within the residentsexpectations.
That is, the residents believed that the observed unemployment rates were possible, and so their occurrence
gives the residents no new information. As a consequence, there is no need for the residents to update
their expectations. Because the expectations are unchanged, the equilibrium population distribution does
not change. This implies that there is no migration as a result of the unemployment shocks. This result
highlights the model misspecication discussed above: the observed level of unemployment does not a¤ect
migration if the observed unemployment does not a¤ect the residentsexpectations.
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Scenario 2:
Assume that region A is hit by an unemployment shock that is outside of the residentsexpectations,
while region B is hit by the same shock as in scenario 1. As region As shock is of an unexpected
magnitude, the nations residents are forced to update their expectations. With a new set of expectations,
the equilibrium population in region A is
RA0 =
a

E

uB
  fE uA+ 2bE h 1  uB2i
2b
f
E
h
(1  uA)2
i
+ 2bE
h
(1  uB)2
i
where
f
E represents the updated expectation. Given the new population distribution we can calculate net
migration as
MigrationA =
RA0  RA
RA
While the resulting value of net migration depends on how much the unemployment observation changes
peoples expectations, the important point to note is migration occurs in response to the change in peoples
expectations.
3 Empirical model
One central prediction emerges from the theoretical model presented above: only shocks to unemployment
that are outside of expectations should impact migration across regions. In this section, we will test this
prediction using US state-level data from 2000 - 2010.4 We will also investigate two related hypotheses.
We hypothesize that unemployment observations that are above (below) peoples expectations cause people
to emigrate from (immigrate into) the state. Also, we hypothesize that shocks that are further away from
expectations, or unemployment observations that cause larger changes in expectations, should have a
larger impact on migration than observations that are only slightly outside of peoples expectations. As
we will show below, we nd substantial evidence for each of these predictions in the data.
Evaluating this theory requires an empirical measure of expectations. There are numerous possible
strategies for obtaining this measure. First, we could assume that people, at some early date, were endowed
with an initial expectation of each states unemployment, ui;e. This value could then be updated using
some backward-looking process, yielding an expected value of the unemployment rate for each region and
for each period. As an example, if we assume that people had adaptive expectations, they might update
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their expectations according to the following rule:
ui;et = u
i;e
t 1 + 

uit   ui;et 1

for some . A similar, and perhaps more common approach would be to endow people with a prior
distribution over a wide support, and then allow Bayesrule to update the prior. Second, we could look
for direct measures of expectations. Analystsforecasts of future unemployment rates, used for each states
budgeting process, are an example of this type of direct measure.
There are di¢ culties associated with each of these strategies. The rst approach is problematic because,
except under very specic and rare circumstances, all unemployment realizations would alter peoples
expectations. While we dont reject this as a possibility, this approach doesnt test our theory, as our model
only updates expectations when the unemployment rate is unexpected. The second approach, obtaining
a direct measure of expectations about future unemployment by month and by state, is problematic, as
data like these are not easily available.
Given these challenges, we take a di¤erent approach, one that is consistent with the theoretical model
presented above. We assume that, at some initial period t0, people form state-specic unemployment
expectations using the history of each states unemployment observations. These expectations are ranges
of unemployment rates that the residents believe to be possible in the following period. Specically, each
range is dened as the set of unemployment values that lie within s  ks, where s is the mean value
of the unemployment observations in state s from [t0   T; t0), s is the standard deviation of those same
observations, and k is a constant. Note that in this denition T represents the number of periods of data
people use to form their initial expectations, and k characterizes the width of the resulting expectations.
Crucially, we assume that any unemployment observation that falls inside the range is within expectations,
while observations that are outside of this range are outside expectations.
With these initial expectations dened, we now must discuss how these expectations evolve over time.
To do this, consider an unemployment rate observed in state s at time t0. This rate could be either inside
or outside the range of initial expectations. If the unemployment rate is inside the range, then people
expected that this unemployment rate was possible. Because of this, people do not have to update their
expectations since the observed rate of unemployment matched their prior expectations. This means
that peoples expectations at date t0 + 1 are the same as date t0. The same logic applies at any date in
the future: as long as the observed value of unemployment is within expectations, then people keep their
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previous periods expectations.
If the unemployment rate is outside the range, though, the observation was a surprise to the residents
and forces them to update their expectations. We assume that at this point, people form their expectations
in a similar manner as at the initial date t0, except now they use the most recent T periods as their
dataset. In this case, s and s would be calculated using [t0 + 1  T; t0] as data.5 For use later, dene
max_unempst (k) as the largest unemployment rate in the range of expectations for state s at time t
using k as the multiple. Similarly, let min_unempst (k) be the smallest unemployment rate in the range
of expectations for state s at time t using k as the multiple.
There are a few points we would like to make about dening expectations in this manner. First, there
might be many periods in a row in which expectations do not change. This would occur if the observed
unemployment rates remain su¢ ciently close to the past observations. Second, while expectations might
be static for long periods of time, they do change to reect new information, as long as that information
is su¢ ciently unlike what has been observed in the past. Table 1 illustrates this point using data from
Colorado and k = 2. The rising unemployment rate in Colorado in late 2008 does not exceed expectations
until it rises above 6.367%, which occurs in January 2009. For the next nine months, the unemployment
rate remains outside of expectations. Meanwhile, expectations are adjusted to reect the new information.
By October 2009, expectations catch up to the new, higher unemployment rate in Colorado. In words,
people adjust their expectations to incorporate a states higher unemployment rate, but that this process
takes time.
Third, if a state has witnessed a particularly volatile path of unemployment, expectations for that state
are relatively broad. This, intuitively, seems reasonable because historical data are less informative about
potential future unemployment rates. Fourth, for larger values of k, the range of expectations grows.
This implies that it would take a more extreme observation of unemployment to induce migration. In our
empirical analysis, we test a variety of values of k to check the robustness of our results to this multiple.
To initialize our algorithm and so determine the path of unemployment expectations over time and by
state, we must make an assumption about T . This constant governs the number of previous periods that
people use to form and update their expectations. A larger value of T would imply that people use a
larger window of past data to form their expectations of future unemployment. In the results presented
below, we assume that T = 120; that is, expectations are based on the past 120 months (or 10 years) of
data. We have also tested the robustness of this value and have found that our results are robust to both
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a 5-year and a 20-year window.
With the state-specic paths of expectations in hand, we now form our two key independent variables.
These variables indicate whether the observed rate of unemployment in state s at time t was within
expectations and, if so, whether the observation was above or below the range. Let
flaghi_kst =
8<: 1 if unempst  max_unempst (k)0 o/w
flaglo_kst =
8<: 1 if unempst  min_unempst (k)0 o/w
With these denitions, if the observed unemployment rate was within expectations, then flaghi_kst =
flaglo_kst = 0. However, if the unemployment rate was outside of the range of expectations, then either
flaghi_kst or flaglo_kst should equal one, depending on whether the observation was above or below the
range of expectations. To form the range and the two indicator variables, we have used unemployment data
from Bureau of Labor Statistics, which compiles them using data from the Current Population Survey.
This data tracks the unemployment rate by state and by month.
In addition to unemployment, we need data on net migration by state and by month. To obtain this,
we use monthly population data for each state from January 2000 to September 2010. These data are
created by the U.S. Census Bureau. With these values, we dene migration as the percent change in
population after mortality is removed. We use percent changes rather than the rst di¤erences since our
geographic unit of observation (states) has a wide range of populations.
Upon examination of the data, we have decided to remove Louisiana and Mississippi from our dataset.
These two states are outliers in both the migration and unemployment data due to Hurricane Katrina.
Our results, though, are robust to this decision.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of our data, including the sample means of flaghi_kst and
flaglo_kst, for several values of k. For each value of k, we have a larger number of high unemployment
periods outside of expectations (i.e., flaghi_kst = 1) than low (i.e., flaglo_kst = 1). One explanation
could be that our sample time frame includes the most recent recession in which unemployment rose
quickly.
In our main empirical specication, we estimate the following xed e¤ects regression:
net_migrationst = 0 + 1  flaghi_ks;t 1 + 2  flaglo_ks;t 1 + s + t + st (3)
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for several values of the multiple k. s represents state-level xed e¤ects, and t represents both yearly
and monthly dummy variables. Including these will help capture any state- or time-invariant e¤ects.
Note that we use the lag of the unemployment variables to allow people time to migrate in response to
changes in their unemployment expectations. Although we present our results using a one period lag, the
results are similar for two-period and three-period lags. For comparison to the extant migration literature,
we also run the same regression adding in the rst di¤erence of unemployment, lagged one period, as
a covariate. All estimations use the heteroskedastic-consistent calculation of the standard errors. The
estimates on the xed e¤ects are not presented below, but are available upon request, as are any of the
other claims made above.
If our theoretical model nds support in the data, then we expect to nd that the coe¢ cients on
the unemployment indicator variables are statistically signicant. Further, we expect that the coe¢ cient
on flaghi_ks;t 1 (flaglo_ks;t 1) is negative (positive), as an unexpectedly large increase (decrease) in
unemployment would deter (spur) immigration.
In the top half of Table 3, we present the numerical results from our main specication, assuming
di¤erent values of the multiple, k. As can be seen, we nd that flaghi_ks;t 1 has the theoretically correct
sign and is statistically signicant at the 1% level across all di¤erent values of k. Also, the coe¢ cient on
flaglo_ks;t 1 is generally positive and signicant, consistent with the theory. The only time in which
the coe¢ cient on flaglo_ks;t 1 takes the opposite sign is when it is not statistically signicant at k = 2.
These results suggest that unexpectedly high observations of unemployment induce emigration from the
state, while unexpectedly low observations of unemployment encourage immigration into the state.
Next, we modify the baseline specication to include unemployments;t 1. The results from these
regressions are presented in the bottom half of Table 3. Similar to the above ndings, flaghi_ks;t 1 is
positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level across all values of k. Further, whenever flaglo_ks;t 1
is statistically signicant (which happens at k = 1 and k = 3), the coe¢ cient is positive, as predicted.
Finally, the coe¢ cient on the change in unemployment is negative and statistically signicant at the 10%
level in each specication that includes this variable. This result runs counter to the simple theoretical
model presented above, which predicts that the observed level (or change) in the unemployment rate is
irrelevant to migration decisions, except insofar as it changes peoples expectations. One reason for this
divergence between the theory and the empirical results could be that we assumed that people expected
an independent and identically distributed unemployment shock in the theoretical model. If, instead,
10
peoples expectations have some history dependence, we would nd that the observed unemployment rate
does inuence migration. We would like to highlight, though, that the t of the change in unemployment
variable is generally worse than the flaghi_ks;t 1 and the flaglo_ks;t 1 variables and, as we will show,
has a considerably smaller economic impact. In addition, including the lagged change in unemployment
produces very small gains in overall explanatory power as measured by the r-squared.
To consider the economic impact of these estimates, consider a 0.1 percentage point increase in monthly
unemployment. If the new unemployment value is within peoples expectations, then (at k = 1) our
results suggest that the median state (with a population around 3.12 million) would lose 22 people in
the following month, an estimate that is statistically signicant at ten percent. If, instead, the new
unemployment value lies outside of peoples expectations, then the median state would lose 586 people, or
0.019% of its population. While these numbers are small percentages of the states population, note that
they reect a monthly impact on population. Also, the average length of time an unemployment rate is
above expectations using k = 1 is 23.5 months. In other words, a median population state that spends the
average length of time above its expected unemployment range loses an estimated 13,771 people or 0.44%
of its population in just under two years.
Our estimates of the impact of an unexpectedly low unemployment shock on migration have a larger
variance across k. The coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signicant for k = 1 and for k = 3, but
not signicant for k = 2. This may be driven by fewer observations of unexpectedly low unemployment
periods. The former type of shock induces an in-migration that is about one-quarter as large as the latter
type induces out-migration.
Exploring our numerical results further, we examine whether unemployment rates that are further
away from the range of expectations have a greater impact on net migration than do unemployment rates
that are close to, but still outside of, the range. Intuitively, this could occur because unemployment
rates that are further away from the range of expectations cause larger changes in residentsexpectations
than unemployment rates closer to the range. To test this, we alter our denitions of the unemployment
indicators to take into account the distance of the unemployment shock from peoples expectations. Let
linearhi_kst =
8<:
unempst s
s
if unempst  max_unempst (k)
0 o/w
linearlo_kst =
8<:
unempst s
s
if unempst  min_unempst (k)
0 o/w
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where s, s, max_unempst (k), and min_unempst (k) are dened as above. The variable linearhi_kst
captures not only whether the observed unemployment rate is above expectations, but also how far above
those expectations, where the distance is measured in standard deviations from the mean. The opposite
is true for linearlo_kst. With these new denitions, we regress net migration on the new unemployment
indicators, each lagged one period, using year, state, and month dummies. For completeness, we also run
the same regression adding in the change in unemployment, lagged one period.
As before, we predict that the coe¢ cient on linearhi_ks;t 1 is negative and the coe¢ cient on linearlo_ks;t 1
is positive. We also expect that an unemployment rate that is further away from expectations should have
a greater impact on migration than an unemployment rate closer to expectations.
Table 4 presents the results from this new regression. The results are consistent with our previous
ndings and in line with our predictions. We nd a negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on
linearhi_ks;t 1 in every specication. Also, all specications have a positive and statistically signicant
coe¢ cient on linearlo_ks;t 1, except when k = 2. One di¤erence from the previous results is that the
change in unemployment variable is no longer statistically signicant at k = 1.
Unsurprisingly, our point estimates are closer to zero than before. This reduction was expected because
we no longer average the impacts of all unexpected unemployment rates, but rather separate them based
on their distance from the mean. These point estimates suggest that, indeed, more extreme unexpected
unemployment shocks have greater e¤ects on migration than less extreme unexpected unemployment
shocks. To see the size of this di¤erence, consider a median population state whose unemployment rate
has jumped outside of expectations. If the unemployment rate is one standard deviation above the mean of
the range of expectations (using k = 1), then 273 people will migrate away from the state in the following
month. But, if the states unemployment rate is two standard deviations above, the states out-migration
will double.
Once again, the migration response for low, unexpected unemployment rates is more volatile relative to
high, unexpected unemployment rates. The amount of this di¤erence depends on the level of k. For k = 1,
unexpectedly low unemployment rates have about half the migration response compared to unexpectedly
high unemployment rates. For k = 3, the migration response is larger for low, unexpected unemploy-
ment rates in absolute terms. More study is needed to examine this point, however, since we have few
observations of large, unexpected improvements in a states unemployment rate in our time frame.
We take the above results to be strong evidence that the role of expectations are central to under-
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standing the impact of unemployment on net migration. In particular, unemployment observations that
are outside of expectations have a much greater impact on migration (by a factor of approximately 25)
than do observations within expectations. Moreover, the further the observation is from the range of
expectations, the greater the impact on migration.
There is, though, a potential concern about the interpretation of our results. Perhaps we are not
capturing how changes in expectations a¤ect net migration in our analysis, but rather we are capturing
the fact that large changes in unemployment drive migration. Under this alternative interpretation, our
expectations variable merely proxies for large unemployment changes. To examine whether this is the
case, we construct a new set of unemployment indicator variables. Let
hi_kst =
8<: 1 if unempst  0:2 and flaghi_kst = 00 o/w
lo_kst =
8<: 1 if unempst   0:2 and flaglo_kst = 00 o/w
These variables isolate periods with large unemployment changes that do not trigger the ag variables.
That is, these new variables collect the largest changes in unemployment (the unemployment change must
be greater than 0.2 in absolute value) in which the resulting unemployment rates are still within peoples
expectations.
Table 5 presents summary statistics for hi_kst and lo_kst. Of the 446 observations whereunempst 
0:2, about 80% overlap with periods in which unemployment is above the expected range, using k = 1.
The amount of overlap drops as k increases because there are fewer periods outside of expectations by
denition. Finally, there is no overlap between periods where unemployment fell more than 0.2 percentage
points and the unemployment rate was below expectations. This second fact immediately o¤ers suggestive
evidence supporting our interpretation that changes in expectations drive net migration, not large changes
in unemployment.
With these variables, we regress net migration on hi_ks;t 1, lo_ks;t 1, and our state, year, and
month dummies. We also could include the flag or linear variables, but we omit these results since
they do not substantially change our ndings. If our theoretical model is correct and expectations are
central to migration, we would expect that the coe¢ cients on hi_ks;t 1 and lo_ks;t 1, to be statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Instead, if the alternative view is correct and migration depends only on large
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changes in unemployment, then we expect that hi_ks;t 1 and lo_ks;t 1 will be statistically signicant
and have the right signs.
Table 6 presents our results from this regression. As can be seen, the coe¢ cients on hi_ks;t 1 and
lo_ks;t 1 are statistically indistinguishable from zero in every specication. We believe that these results,
combined with Tables 3 and 4, provide substantial support for our interpretation that unemployment
expectations are central to understanding migration, while providing no evidence that large changes in
monthly unemployment drive migration. It is this latter point that strengthens our earlier assertion that
the previous literatures regression of net migration on the observed values of unemployment led to model
misspecication and hence, mixed results.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a parsimonious theoretical model that shows that migration only occurs when
an unemployment rate causes expectations to change rather than occurring whenever the unemployment
rate changes. That is, only in periods where the observed unemployment rate is outside of expectations
is there a familiar linear e¤ect on migration. Our empirical model veries this prediction. A change
in the monthly unemployment rate produces vastly di¤erent e¤ects on migration depending on whether
the new unemployment rate is within expectations or not. Using k = 1 and a median population state,
a 0.1 percentage point increase in the monthly unemployment rate corresponds to an out-migration of
22 people compared to 586 people if the shock pushes the new unemployment rate above expectations.
We also nd in-migration for periods where the unemployment rate is unexpectedly low, though this
estimate uctuates depending on the breadth of expectations. Finally, our robustness check veries that
our conclusions are not spurious due to the correlation between our denition of expectations and large
changes in unemployment.
Our ndings provide a potential explanation for regions of persistent poverty, e.g. Appalachia or some
inner-cities, where out-migration occurs slower than expected. For residents of these areas, a high unem-
ployment rate is likely within their expectations since it has occurred often in the past. As a consequence,
residents of Appalachia or these inner-cities dont migrate out because the high unemployment rate didnt
change their expectations.
We also believe that our approach to modeling and empirically measuring expectations could have a
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wide range of applications outside of the migration literature. For example, consider the random variable
associated with the growth rate in the average housing price in the U.S. Because that random variable
was consistently positive prior to 2008, many investors and regulators behaved as if it could not become
negative. This state of the world was outside of their expectations. Only after the random variable was
observed to be negative and investors were forced to update their expectations did their behavior change.
There remains some ambiguity about our model of expectations. Specically, how do consumers
transform information into expectations for the future? For example, how far back in the past do they use
information (that is, what is the true value of T )? How wide are their expectations (k)? Do they update
expectations each period or only when shocks are outside of expectations? Fortunately, our estimates are
largely robust across these questions, but we believe that understanding the formation of expectations is
the next step in specifying the relationship between unemployment and migration.
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Notes
1We do not claim that this is the only denition of shocks that are outside or within expectations. Instead, our assumed
denition is merely one of many possible denitions. As such, our empirical results should be viewed as supportive but not
conclusive evidence on the implications of our theoretical model.
2Although this model is written without explicit reference to time, we implicitly assume that all workers living in a
region have an equal probability of being employed in the following period, where that probability is equal to one minus the
unemployment rate.
3Our assumption that residents believe that the regionsunemployment rate draws are i.i.d. is not innocuous. We could
have, instead, assumed that there was some history dependence in peoples expectations (the shock could be characterized
by a random walk process, for example). This alternative assumption would imply that all unemployment observations alter
peoples expectations. While we do not reject this as a possibility, the goal of our theoretical model is to show that only
unemployment observations that change peoples expectations cause migration. As such, we needed a process in which some
observations change peoples expectations while others do not.
4To be more precise, we have unemployment data by month and by state from 1990-2010 and net migration data by month
and by state from 2000-2010. We use the pre-2000 unemployment data to create our measure of the initial expectations of
the states unemployment rates for the year 2000. Then, with the algorithm detailed below, we use the unemployment data
to update expectations and to determine which unemployment observations are within those expectations and which are
outside. With this information, we test that prediction of our theoretical model that only shocks that change expectations
a¤ect net migration.
5As a robustness check, we considered an alternative approach to forming peoples unemployment expectations. In that
approach, we assumed that people updated their expectations each period using a rolling window of past unemployment
observations, regardless of whether the unemployment observation was outside or inside expectations. This alternative
approach yielded qualitatively similar results to the model we currently present. The results from that alternative approach
are available on request from the authors.
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Table 1: Expectations Definition Example: Colorado 
 
year µst σst lower  
bound 
upper 
bound 
unemp. 
rate 
outside 
of exp.? 
Sep 2008 4.431 0.968 2.495 6.367 5.1 no 
Oct 2008 4.431 0.968 2.495 6.367 5.4 no 
Nov 2008 4.431 0.968 2.495 6.367 5.7 no 
Dec 2008 4.431 0.968 2.495 6.367 6.2 no 
Jan 2009 4.539 1.139 2.261 6.816 6.7 yes 
Feb 2009 4.571 1.146 2.279 6.862 7.3 yes 
Mar 2009 4.606 1.162 2.282 6.932 7.7 yes 
Apr 2009 4.648 1.186 2.276 7.019 8.1 yes 
May2009  4.690 1.218 2.254 7.127 8.2 yes 
Jun 2009 4.732 1.252 2.228 7.237 8.3 yes 
Jul 2009 4.774 1.287 2.200 7.349 8.1 yes 
Aug 2009 4.814 1.316 2.182 7.446 7.9 yes 
Sep 2009 4.853 1.338 2.177 7.529 7.7 yes 
Oct 2009 4.853 1.338 2.177 7.529 7.5 no 
Nov 2009 4.853 1.338 2.177 7.529 7.4 no 
Dec 2009 4.853 1.338 2.177 7.529 7.3 no 
 
Note: This example uses k = 2. The formula for the range of expectations is µst ± 
2σst. To determine whether an unemployment rate is outside the range of 
expectations, it is compared against the previous month’s upper and lower 
bounds.   
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
 mean 
(standard deviation) 
 
population growth rate 0.092 
(0.006) 
 
∆ unemployment rate 0.036 
(0.139) 
 
k = 1 frequency percent  
outside high 1,676 26.51% 
outside low 1,338 21.17% 
k = 2   
outside high 840 13.29% 
outside low 202 3.20% 
k = 3   
outside high 354 5.60% 
outside low 34 0.54% 
 
Note: There are 6,321 state-month observations.  
 
  
Table 3: Estimation – Intercept Effect 
(p-values in parentheses) 
 
 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 
estimation without  
∆ unemployment 
   
flaghi_ ks,t−1  -0.01854 
(<0.001) 
-0.01709 
(<0.001) 
-0.01817 
(<0.001) 
flaglo_ ks,t−1  0.00632 
(0.001) 
-0.0029 
(0.491) 
0.0208 
(0.043) 
r-squared 0.6848 0.6815 0.6815 
estimation with 
∆ unemployment 
   
∆ unemployment t-1  -0.00702 
(0.088) 
-0.01331 
(0.001) 
-0.01044 
(0.009) 
flaghi_ ks,t−1  -0.01816 
(<0.001) 
-0.01683 
(<0.001) 
-0.01748 
(<0.001) 
flaglo_ ks,t−1  0.00597 
(0.003) 
-0.00356 
(0.395) 
0.02021 
(0.050) 
r-squared 0.6850 0.6821 0.6819 
 
Note: These estimations also include year dummies, month dummies, and state-
level fixed effects. 
 
  
Table 4: Estimation – Linear Effect 
(p-values in parentheses) 
 
 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 
estimation without  
∆ unemployment 
   
linearhi_ ks,t−1  -0.00875 
(<0.001) 
-0.00564 
(<0.001) 
-0.00526 
(<0.001) 
linearlo_ ks,t−1 0.00452 
(0.001) 
-0.00040 
(0.829) 
0.00829 
(0.016) 
r-squared 0.6869 0.6818 0.6819 
estimation with 
∆ unemployment 
   
∆ unemploymentt-1 -0.00157 
(0.699) 
-0.01141 
(0.004) 
-0.01001 
(0.012) 
linearhi_ ks,t−1  -0.00869 
(<0.001) 
-0.00548 
(<0.001) 
-0.0051 
(<0.001) 
linearlo_ ks,t−1 0.00446 
(0.001) 
-0.00064 
(0.732) 
0.00812 
(0.018) 
r-squared 0.6869 0.6822 0.6823 
 
Note: These estimations also include year dummies, month dummies, and state-
level fixed effects. 
 
  
Table 5: Robustness Check – Summary Statistics 
 
 frequency  
∆ unemployment > 0.2 446  
∆ unemployment < -0.2 41  
Overlap unemployment above 
expectations 
unemployment below 
expectations 
k = 1 357 
(80.04%) 
0 
k = 2 191 
(42.83%) 
0 
k = 3 114 
(25.26%) 
0 
 
Note: Overlap refers to the number of observations where ∆ unemployment > 0.2 
and the unemployment rate is outside of expectations for a given value of k. The 
percentages refer to the percent overlap and are taken out of 446.  
  
Table 6: Robustness Check – Estimation 
(p-values in parentheses) 
 
 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 
estimation without  
∆ unemployment 
   
hi_ ks,t−1 -0.00068 
(0.861) 
-0.00346 
(0.158) 
-0.00339 
(0.128) 
lo_ ks,t−1  0.00049 
(0.933) 
0.00048 
(0.935) 
0.00043 
(0.942) 
r-squared 0.6800 0.6801 0.6801 
estimation with 
∆ unemployment 
   
∆ unemployment  -0.01610 
(<0.001) 
-0.01550 
(0.001) 
-0.01602 
(0.001) 
hi_ ks,t−1 0.00268 
(0.501) 
0.00006 
(0.982) 
0.00064 
(0.779) 
lo_ ks,t−1  -0.00590 
(0.333) 
-0.00568 
(0.353) 
-0.00587 
(0.339) 
r-squared 0.6807 0.6807 0.6807 
 
Note: These estimations also include year dummies, month dummies, and state-
level fixed effects. 
 
 
